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Abstract. The ability to communicate securely is needed for many net-
work applications. Public key infrastructure (PKI) is the most extended
solution to verify and conﬁrm the identity of each party involved in any
secure transaction and transfer trust over the network. One of the hardest
tasks of a certiﬁcation infrastructure is to manage revocation. Research
on this topic has focused on the trade-oﬀs that diﬀerent revocation mech-
anisms oﬀer. However, less eﬀort has been paid to understand the ben-
eﬁts of improving the revocation policies. In this paper, we analyze the
behavior of the oligopoly of certiﬁcate providers that issue digital certiﬁ-
cates to clients facing identical independent risks. We found the prices in
the equilibrium, and we proof that certiﬁcate providers that oﬀer better
revocation information are able to impose higher prices to their certiﬁ-
cates without sacriﬁcing market share in favor of the other oligarchs. In
addition, we show that our model is able to explain the actual tendency
of the SSL market where providers with worst QoS are suﬀering loses.
Keywords: PKI pricing, SSL certiﬁcates, CRLs.
1 Introduction
Nowadays, there is a wide range of technology, products and solutions for se-
curing electronic infrastructures. As with physical access security, the levels of
security implemented should be commensurate with the level of complexity, the
applications in use, the data in play, and the measurement of the overall risk at
stake. A consensus has emerged among technical experts and information man-
agers in government and industry that Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) oﬀers
the best feasible solution to these issues. PKI [1] has been a popular, yet often
reviled technology since its adoption in the early nineties.
Currently deployed PKIs rely mostly on Certiﬁcate Revocation Lists (CRLs)
for handling certiﬁcate revocation [2]. Although CRLs are the most widely used
way of distributing certiﬁcate status information, much research eﬀort has been
put on studying other revocation distribution mechanisms in a variety of scenar-
ios [3,4]. These studies aim to compare the performance of diﬀerent revocation
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mechanisms in diﬀerent scenarios. However, none of these studies have explicitly
modeled the interaction among CAs. In this paper, we model this interaction by
using a game-theoretic approach.
With the appearance of novel network environments (e.g VANET orMANET),
the quantity of CAs in the SSL certiﬁcate market is becoming larger and the
market concentration diminishes, but it is not simple to eliminate the oligopoly in
the short-term. During the 90s, the certiﬁcation market, the competition among
CAs appears mainly as price competition. In this situation, malignant price com-
petition would be detrimental to the interests of the users and lead to the CA’s
pay crisis. Facing the situation, the main CAs have begun to change the com-
petitive strategies from basic price competition to price and quality of services
(QoS) competition. To provide better QoS, CAs have to improve their revoca-
tion service, and speciﬁcally the freshness of the CRLs. Users will pay more for a
service that issues certiﬁcate status information faster. Time-to-revocation met-
ric is visible to costumers by checking the CA’s repositories where they publicize
the revocation information.
The model of this article deals with an oligopoly of CAs which compete in cer-
tiﬁcate prices and QoS, and do not know the certiﬁcate revocation probability in
the next interval for sure. The assumption that the revocation probability is ex-
ante uncertain is quite logical and intuitive. The number of revoked certiﬁcates
vary with time and in a manner that cannot predictable with certainty. We show
that an uncertain revocationprobability introduces a systematic risk that does not
decrease by selling more certiﬁcates. If CAs are risk averse, this eﬀect relaxes price
competition. The equilibrium characteristic of the certiﬁcation market is found by
establishing a price competition model with diﬀerent QoS. We consider that there
are diversities in the certiﬁcation service quality, andwe describe factors that aﬀect
the service quality such as the CRL lifetime. By combining the characteristics of
the certiﬁcationmarket and considering the conveniences of modeling, two key pa-
rameters are selected to measure the QoS and a duopoly price competition model
with service quality diﬀerentiation is established.
2 Related Work
Although PKI has been a widely adopted solution for many years now, very few
works have dealt with the impact of the revocation mechanism in the prices CAs
oﬀer. Most of the literature [4,5], intend to optimize the revocation mechanism
to minimize the overhead or to improve the reliability. However, the most ex-
tended revocation mechanism is still CRL. Authors in [6] analyze the revocation
mechanisms based on based on empirical data from a local network. They con-
clude that the freshness of the revocation data depends on how often the end
entities retrieve the revocation information but the bandwidth cost is high if end
entities retrieve the revocation lists often.
Ma et al. in [7] propose a series of policies that certiﬁcation authorities should
followwhen releasing revocation information.According to this study, aCA should
take diﬀerent strategies when providing certiﬁcate services for a new type of cer-
tiﬁcates versus a re-serving type of certiﬁcates. Authors give the steps by which a
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CA can derive optimal CRL releasing strategies and they prove that a CA should
release CRLs less frequently in the case that the ﬁxed cost is higher, the variable
cost is higher, the liability cost is lower, or the issued age of certiﬁcates is shorter.
Similarly authors in [8] authors address the CRL release problem through a sys-
tematic and rigorous approach which relies on a mix of empirical estimation and
analytical modeling. They propose four diﬀerent models which seek to exploit the
variation in certiﬁcate speciﬁc properties to provide guidance to the CA in deter-
mining the optimal CRL release intervals and the associated costs. However, none
of these works neither analyze the impact of CRLs releasing policies in the prices
that the CA charges nor model the interaction among CAs. In this paper, we ad-
dress these issues using a game theoretic approach.
3 Modeling the Certificate Provider Competition
To formalize our arguments we describe a model of the certiﬁcate market with
proﬁt-maximizing certiﬁcation authorities and a continuum of network users.
When a user requests the status of given certiﬁcate, the CA does not always
provides the most updated information but a pre-signed CRL [4,5]. In this con-
text, the CA will bear the liability cost due to any damage that may occur
between the revocation of a certiﬁcate and the release of the CRL.
3.1 Demand for Certiﬁcates
We consider an oligopoly of A CAs, indexed by i = 1, · · · , A − 1, and N users
in the economy, where N is large relative to A.Each user has the same strictly
concave expected utility function and faces the risk to lose l when using a re-
voked certiﬁcates. The probability π of operating with a revoked certiﬁcate is
equal for each user in the network, and conditional on π operating with revoked
certiﬁcates of diﬀerent users are statistically independent. This probability is out
of the user’s control so that no moral hazard problem arises. Except for their
probabilities of operating with revoked certiﬁcates, individuals are assumed to
be identical. However, π is not known ex-ante with certainty but is a random
variable distributed on [π;π] with cumulative density function F (π). Each user
has an initial wealth w > 0. When operating with a revoked certiﬁcate, users
may suﬀer a loss. We assume that the user’s wealth exceeds the potential loss,
that is, l ≤ w.
Users can purchase diﬀerent certiﬁcate types from the CA with diﬀerent revo-
cation updating service. We characterize this product by the price of the certiﬁ-
cate Pi > 0 and an indemnity Ci > 0 the CA pays to the user if it suﬀers from an
attack and operates with another user whose certiﬁcate was revoked. Note that
as CRLs are not issued each time a certiﬁcate is revoked but periodically, users
will be operating with outdated information. Let (Pi, Ci, ti, si) be a certiﬁcate
contract oﬀered by CAi which speciﬁes the price Pi to be paid by an user and
the level of coverage Ci paid to the user if an attack takes place and she operates
with a revoked certiﬁcate. Let ti represent the CRL updating interval, and si
represent the security level.
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Let us assume that the total utility U which users can get after they purchase a
certiﬁcate consists of two parts. The ﬁrst part is wealth utility which represented
by Uw the other part is QoS utility which the applicant can get after they obtained
the CA’s services, represented by UQoS . The total utility U is deﬁned as:
U(Pi, Ci, ti, si) = α1Uw + α2UQoS ,∀αk ∈ [0, 1] and
∑
αk = 1; k = 1, 2. (1)
where αi represents the signiﬁcance level of U respectively.
On the one hand, we calculate the wealth utility. If no attack due to misuse
of a revoked certiﬁcate happens after the user has purchase the service the CA,
a user gains w − Pi, on the contrary a user gains w − Pi + Ci. We assume that
all users have same loss with two-point distribution:
μ = (w − Pi)(1− π) + (w − Pi + Ci)π = w − Pi + πCi, (2)
σ2 = π(1 − π)C2i . (3)
Hence we can characterize the wealth utility by the mean and variance of Eq. (2)
and Eq. (3) respectively. Thus, we can deﬁne Uw as a mean-variance utility
function:
Uw(Pi, Ci) = μ−Rσ2, (4)
where R represents the Arrow-Pratt index of absolute risk aversion. This means
that the larger R is, the more risk averse the user is and the smaller Uw is.
On the other hand, let UQoS be a linear function of the QoS that the CA
oﬀers. Thus, we deﬁne UQoS as:
UQoS(ti, si) = πθ
(
β1si + β2
1
ti
)
,∀βk ∈ [0, 1],
∑
βk = 1 and θ > 0; k = 1, 2. (5)
where θ represents the quality preference parameter of the user, and β1 represents
the user’s preference to security level and β2 represents the user’s preference to
CRL issuing interval. Note that the higher the level of security the CA provides,
the larger UQoS is; the longer the CRL updating interval is, the smaller UQoS is.
It is also worth noting that θ is unknown to the CAs a priori.
In order to calculate the total utility of the user, we must unify the dimension
of the security level and the CRL updating interval. Thus, using (1),(4) and (5)
the total utility is calculated as:
U(Pi, Ci, ti, si) = α1[w − Pi − πCi −Rπ(1− π)C2i ] + α2
[
πθ
(
β1si + β2
1
ti
)]
. (6)
Note that according to this expression, users are willing to pay higher prices for
those certiﬁcates whose issuer provides a better QoS. Note that issuing certiﬁcate
status information faster, highly increases the QoS of the revocation service.
Thus, certiﬁcates linked to a better revocation service provide more utility to
the user.
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3.2 Supply of Certiﬁcates
We consider an oligopoly of CAs operating in the certiﬁcation market. CAs
compete for users by oﬀering certiﬁcates and CRLs. The service qualities of
their CA products are also diﬀerent. The level of service quality is mainly shown
by the CRL updating interval and the security level1.
When choosing a CA, a user takes into account several factors. Our goal is to
gauge the impact of the revocation service on the certiﬁcate prices. However, it
should be noted that, for convenience, many website owners choose the registrar’s
authority regardless of the price. Before issuing a certiﬁcate, the CA veriﬁes that
the person making the request is authorized to use the domain. The CA sends an
email message to the domain administrator (the administrative or registrant con-
tact, as listed in the Whois database) to validate domain control. If there is no
contact information in the Whois database or the information is no longer valid,
the customer may instead request a Domain Authorization Letter from his/her
registrar and submit the letter to the CA as proof of his/her domain control. If
the administrative/registrant contact fails to approve the certiﬁcate request, the
request is denied. This authentication process ensures that only an individual who
has control of the domain in the request can obtain a certiﬁcate for that domain.
Therefore as CAs compete by quoting a certiﬁcate price which has associated a
particular quality of service, we have Bertrand competition. The CA that quotes
the lowest certiﬁcate price with the highest QoS sells to all users.
4 Equilibrium Certificate Providers
In this section we consider the certiﬁcation industry with an oligopoly ofA certiﬁ-
cation authorities and analyze the competitive forces that determine equilibrium
of certiﬁcate selling. Our main goal is to ﬁnd the prices at which CAs obtain their
maximum proﬁt, i.e., when they reach the game equilibrium. Recall that these
certiﬁcates diﬀer in the QoS so that ∀i, j; i = j, ti = tj and si = sj . We assume
that the certiﬁcation market is covered in full. Users will intend to maximize their
utility, i.e.:
θ∗ = argmax
θ
U(Pi, Ci). (7)
On the other hand, CAs will intend to minimize their costs. The CA’s costs
consists of ﬁxed and variable costs. Each time a new CRL is issued, a CA incurs
both ﬁxed and variable costs. The ﬁxed cost depends on two factors. The ﬁx
component is due to the release of a new CRL, and does not depend on the
number or certiﬁcate type. The variable factor depends on the number of cer-
tiﬁcates contained in the CRL (i.e. depends on the size of the CRL) and on the
type of certiﬁcate (i.e. certiﬁcate with higher security level induce higher costs).
Note that in this variable cost it is included the cost of processing each certiﬁcate
1 Note that additional QoS parameters could be introduced in the model. In fact, CAs
distinguish themselves by oﬀering additional value-added services (e.g. GoDaddy
bundling domain registration with certiﬁcate issuance), turn-around time, etc.
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revocation request. We deﬁne the service quality cost of CAi (i.e. Q(si, ti)) as a
variable that includes both ﬁxed and variable costs associated to the QoS. The
ﬁrst and second derivative of Q(si, ti) with respect to si, ti are positive. Hence,
we can calculate the gain function Gi of any CAi:
Gi = θ
∗Pi −Q(si, ti), (8)
where the gain function captures the overall proﬁts of CAi for a given certiﬁcate
product characterized by (Pi, Ci).
We assume that the game between the two CAs is static with incomplete
information, they choose the respective certiﬁcate price at the same time to
maximize their proﬁts. Now we diﬀerentiate (8) with respect to Pi and Ci. In
order to obtain the certiﬁcate price and the coverage in the equilibrium, let each
derivative formula equal to zero. Solving the resulting linear system, we will
obtain the price of each CA P ∗i and the corresponding coverage C
∗
i .
P ∗i :
∂Gi
∂Pi
= 0, C∗i :
∂Gi
∂Ci
= 0. (9)
4.1 Duopoly of CAs
To better illustrate the results obtained in the previous section, we particularize
the case of the oligopoly to a duopoly where only two CAs are oﬀering certiﬁcates.
This simpliﬁcation, we allows us to draw some conclusion that can be easily
extrapolated to the real scenario where there are more than a dozen CAs. To
show that the level of service quality depends on the CA, we assume that the
CA indexed by i = 1 oﬀers better quality than the second CA in both QoS
parameters, i.e., t1 < t2 and s1 > s2.
Following the methodology aforementioned, we have to ﬁnd the prices in the
equilibrium. In this situation, ﬁrst we ﬁnd the value of θ∗ at which a user has
no obvious trend between the certiﬁcates oﬀered by diﬀerent CAs.
α1[w − P1 − πC1 −Rπ(1− π)C21 ] + α2
[
πθ
(
β1s1 + β2
1
t1
)]
=
α1[w − P2 − πC2 −Rπ(1− π)C22 ] + α2
[
πθ
(
β1s2 + β2
1
t2
)]
, (10)
which results in:
θ∗ =
α1 (P1 − P2 + πC1(1 +RC1 −RπC1)− πC2(1−RC2 +RπC2))
πα2K
(11)
where K = β1(s1 − s2) + β2
(
1
t1
− 1t2
)
. So the market demand of CA2 is θ
∗, and
the demand of CA1 is 1− θ∗.
Using (8) we calculate the gain function Gi of CA1 and CA2 :
G1 = (1− θ∗P1)−Q(s1, t1), (12)
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G2 = θ
∗P2 −Q(s2, t2). (13)
We obtain the certiﬁcate price and the coverage in the equilibrium :
P ∗1 =
2π α2K
3α1
P ∗2 =
π α2K
3α1
, C∗1 = C
∗
2 =
1
2R (−1 + π) . (14)
From these results we can conclude that:
– In the equilibrium, when both CAs achieve their maximum gain, CA1 obtains
a higher price than CA2. This is mainly due to the fact that when both CAs
have associated the same probability of an attack, as the QoS of the ﬁrst
CA is better so that CA1 can set a higher price per certiﬁcate.
– In the equilibrium, the coverage that each CA should establish is the same
and is inversely proportional to the risk-aversion and the probability of op-
erating with a revoked certiﬁcate.
5 Analysis and Results
5.1 Impact of the Preference Ratio α2
α1
As the ratio between the preference of QoS utility and wealth utility of the user
increases (i.e., users are more interested in a high security service and a good
revocation mechanism) the prices of both CAs in the equilibrium also increase.
This eﬀect is reasonable, as the improvement of the revocation mechanism gives
a higher security level which also increases the costs. This cost increment is com-
pensated with a higher price in the equilibrium. Analyzing two CAs operating in
the oligopoly such that ti < tj and si > sj , it is worth noting that the increment
speed of CAi’s QoS is faster than that of CAj , so the increment speed of its
certiﬁcate price is also faster than the other CA.
5.2 Impact of the Security Level Diﬀerence
When the level of security that a CA oﬀers is much higher than in the others,
the certiﬁcate value is also much higher. Thus, CAs that oﬀer certiﬁcates with
higher level of encryption and larger keys are able to make their certiﬁcation
product diﬀerentiable. For instance, SSL security levels vary depending upon
the way on SSL certiﬁcate is installed on a server and the conﬁguration used.
SSL is simple to use but its security can be compromised if basic installation an
conﬁgurations are not completed to a competent level, hackers are then able to
decrypt the security on a badly installed SSL certiﬁcate. Once the certiﬁcates of
a CA are diﬀerentiable from the other CAs, CAs do not have to use malignant
prices anymore to compete. As the diﬀerence of this QoS between CAs becomes
bigger, the prices that they can charge also increase. Note that if the preference
extent which the user shows to the security level (i.e. β1) increases, the diﬀerences
in the certiﬁcates as products will be more apparent, thus the increase in the
CA’s certiﬁcate prices will also increase. The same results are expected with the
increment of the interest of the users to a better service from the CAs (α2), that
is, not higher security but also a more eﬃcient revocation mechanism.
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5.3 Impact of the QoS of the Revocation Mechanism
CAs that are able to oﬀer revocation mechanisms with fresher information and
high availability are able to make their certiﬁcation product diﬀerentiable. Re-
call that this QoS increase of the revocation mechanism induces higher costs, as
revocation information has to be issued more frequently. These costs are com-
pensated with an increase of the price that CAs can charge for the certiﬁcates
in the equilibrium. The reasons are the same that in the previous case, but now
users pay more attention to the revocation mechanism rather than to the level
of security. Analytically, that means that β2 increases, so that the user is more
interested in the eﬃciency of the revocation mechanism. This increase induces
a proportional increase in the equilibrium prices of the CAs. Note that in this
case, the increase of CAi which has higher QoS of the revocation mechanism
is faster than that of CAj . Again, the CA that has better service (no matter
if it is higher security level or a more eﬃcient revocation mechanism) has the
advantage in competition.
5.4 Impact of the Revocation Probability
Logically, with an increase of the probability of operating with a revoked certiﬁ-
cate, CAs charge more for their certiﬁcates. The reason is obvious as the CAs set
they price mainly based on a forecast of this probability. An increase of π will
induce an increase of the compensation expenses that a CA will have to pay to
any victim of an attack due to the misuse of a revoked certiﬁcate. Consequently,
this increase will lead to a proportional increase of compensation cost and ser-
vice cost so that the CAs have to increase their prices to compensate the cost
increases. Note that this increase is twice faster in the case of the CAi.
6 Case Study: SSL Providers
Finally, to corroborate the beneﬁts of the presented model, we analyze the case
of current SSL providers that issue digital certiﬁcates. An SSL certiﬁcate can be
obtained from amounts as low as $43 to as high as $3000 per year. Whilst the
type of encryption can be the same, the cost is determined by the rigour of the
certiﬁcation process as well as the assurance and warranty that the vendor can
provide. Table 1 shows the prices and QoS that the leading CAs operating in the
SSL Certiﬁcate market are oﬀering. The SSL Certiﬁcate market was traditionally
dominated by a small number of players, namely VeriSign and Thawte. Whilst
in a monopolistic position they had the capability of charging inﬂated prices for
a commodity product. However new providers with no necessity to hold prices
high were able to oﬀer SSL certiﬁcates at far more reasonable prices.
The SSL certiﬁcate vendors provide insurance against the misuse of certiﬁcates
and this diﬀers from one vendor to another. Verisign provides warranties of up to
$250,000 while Entrust and GoDaddy oﬀer a $10,000 warranty. The higher the
insurance, the more inscription/authentication is provided by the SSL vendors.
30 C. Gan˜a´n et al.
Analyzing Table 1, it is worth noting that not always a lower price means lower
quality. Therefore, it is evident that current CAs operating in this market are
competing both in price and quality of service.
To test whether these factors are determinant factors for the certﬁcate prices,
we perform a multivariate regression analysis explaining the yearly price of SSL
certiﬁcates. General regression investigates and models the relationship between
a response (Certiﬁcate price) and predictors (Warranty, issuing interval and CRL
lifetime). Note that the response of this model is continuous, but you we have
both continuous and categorical predictors. You can model both linear and poly-
nomial relationships using general regression. With this model we determine how
the certﬁcate price changes as a particular predictor variable changes. We use
data from a survey of CAs performed in 2010 [9]. The obtained regression model
is expressed in the following equations for high and low assurance certiﬁcates,
respectively:
Price/Y ear($) = 98, 4353 + 0, 000220857 W − 0, 549141 Itime + 8, 6116 1
CRLLf
,
P rice/Y ear($) = 20, 0405 + 0, 000220857 W − 0, 5491411 Itime + 8, 6116 1
CRLLf
,
where W denotes the warranty, Itime is the mean issuing time, and CRLLf is
the mean lifetime of the CRLs issued by the CA.
Note that both regression equations show that the coeﬃcient of the predictor
associated to the CRL’s mean lifetime is signiﬁcant. In fact, the p-value associ-
ated to this predictor is 0, 008 which indicates that is statistically signiﬁcantly.
Overall, the variables within the model are explaining a large portion of the
variation in the certiﬁcate price. With a coeﬃcient of determination R2 above
the 81%, we are capturing important drivers of certiﬁcate prices. The residuals
from the analysis are normally distributed, i.e., no evidence of nonnormality,
skewness, or unidentiﬁed variables exists.
Table 1. SSL Certiﬁcate Types and Services oﬀered by main CAs [9]
SSL Provider Product Name Price/Year($) Warranty($) Assurance Mean Issuing time Mean CRL
lifetime
COMODO EnterpriseSSL Plat-
inum
311.80 1,000,000 High Under 1 hour 4 days
COMODO InstantSSL Pro 169.80 100,000 High Under 1 hour 4 days
Verisign Secure Site Pro Cert 826.67 2,500,000 High 2-3 days 15 days
Verisign Managed PKI for
SSL Std
234.00 100,000 High 2-3 days 15 days
GeoTrust QuickSSL Premium 118.00 100,000 Low Immediate 10 days
GeoTrust True BusinessID 159.20 100,000 High 2 days 10 days
Go Daddy Standard SSL 42.99 10,000 Low Immediate 1 day
Go Daddy Standard Wildcard 179.99 10,000 Low Immediate 1 day
Entrust Advantage SSL Cer-
tiﬁcates
167.00 10,000 High 2 days 1 week
Entrust Standard SSL Cer-
tiﬁcates
132.00 10,000 High 2 days 1 week
Thawte SSL 123 129.80 - Low Immediate 1 month
Thawte SGC Super cert 599.80 - High 2 days 1 month
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Using the proposed model, we are able to explain these diﬀerent prices and
the corresponding market share and they potential evolution. First we analyze
the number of revoked certiﬁcates as it will determine the probability of operat-
ing with a revoked certiﬁcate. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the daily number
of revoked certiﬁcates per CA. These data were collected from diﬀerent SSL
CRLs that the CAs make public at their repositories. It is worth noting, that
the number of revoked certiﬁcates highly varies depending on the CA. Thus,
GoDaddy revokes more than 500 certiﬁcates per day on average while VerSign
revokes less than 4 certiﬁcates per day on average. Therefore, the probability π of
operating with revoked certiﬁcates is higher when trusting certiﬁcates issued by
GoDaddy. As our model shows, using expression (14), the probability π directly
aﬀects the price of the certiﬁcate. Thus, as GoDaddy has a higher π, we would
expect to charge less for its certiﬁcates. However, the price is quite similar to its
competitors. Thus, GoDaddy is not able to sell as much certiﬁcates as the other
oligarchs, and its market share is smaller.
Our model would expect GoDaddy to compete not only in prices but also
in QoS to gain market share. As our model shows, the reaction of GoDaddy to
compete in the oligopoly is to oﬀer better quality of service. From table 1, we
can see that GoDaddy is the CA that issues CRLs more often. Using this CRL
releasing policy, users increase their utility and, at the same time, the probability
of operating with a revoked certiﬁcate is also reduced. However, the variable
costs increase due to this way of issuing CRLs. Similarly, Comodo intends to
gain market share by decreasing the time it takes to issue a certiﬁcate and also
reducing the CRL lifetime. Note that VeriSign, the leading CA, is the one who
is oﬀering the worst QoS, both in terms of CRL lifetime and time to issue a new
certiﬁcate.
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Fig. 1. Evolution of the daily number of revoked certiﬁcates per CA
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7 Conclusions
The market of certiﬁcate providers can be described as an oligopoly where oli-
garchs compete not only in price but also in quality of service. In this paper we
have modeled this oligopoly using a game theoretic approach to ﬁnd the prices
in the equilibrium. We have been able to capture the QoS of the products of-
fered by a CA, by means of the timeliness of the revocation mechanism and the
security level. In our model of the certiﬁcation industry with proﬁt-maximizing
CAs and a continuum of individuals we showed that although the undercutting
process in certiﬁcation prices seems similar to the price setting behavior of ﬁrms
in Bertrand competition there exists a crucial diﬀerence depending onf the QoS
of the revocation service. The solution of the game for two CAs in the oligopoly
that oﬀer certiﬁcates with diﬀerent QoS shows that the revenues of the CA which
provides a better revocation mechanism and a higher security level are larger.
Therefore, a CA when setting the prices of its certiﬁcate and the compensation
expenses, it has to take into account not only the probability of operating with
a revoked certiﬁcate, but also the quality of the revocation mechanism and the
security level. Thus, any CA should comprehensively consider the diﬀerence in
quality of its services compared with other CAs.
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